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Introduction
MalaWi (formerly Nyasaland) and Madagascar are poor, agricultural nations in southern Africa that have chosen very different strategies of development. Mala i carries a "capitalist" label and has focused its governmental development efforts on the agricultural sector up to the early 1980s; Madagascar carries a "Marxist" label and, in the decade from 1975 to 1985, has chosen to direct its major attention to the industrial sector. In some respects, the economic performance of the two nations has been very different: for instance, between 1960 and 1986, Mala i had an average annual increase of per capita GDP of about 1.6%, while Madagascar had an average annual decrease of about 1.1%. In other respects, performance was relatively similar. For instance, both countries experienced widening differentials of income and increasing poverty, but especially Malaci.
In poor agricultural nations, an increasing inequality in the distribution of income for the nation as a whole can come about for three 2 reasons.
1. The income inequalities within the urban or rural sectors widen. As shown below, the greater income differentials in the rural sectors of the two countries were the most important factors underlying the overall increasing inequalities of income.
2. The relative number of families increases in the urban sector (as long as the urban sector accounts for less than half of the population), where average incomes are higher. Although such a population movement occurred to a limited extent in both countries, it did not have an important impact on the overall distribution of income.
3. The disparity in average incomes of families in the urban and rural sectors widens. In both MalaWi and Madagascar, however, this Structural Features of Income Inequality Several features of these estimates immediately draw our attention. First, in both countries the single most important factor underlying the overall inequalities of income was the difference in average income between urban and rural populations. This can be shown by comparing the income inequality coefficients for the entire economy without adjustments to the hypothetical situation where all incomes in a particular population group are equal to the mean. In three of the four cases the inequality coefficients in the latter case accounted for roughly one-half or more of total income inequalities.
Second, in both countries the inequalities in the rural sector were considerable, particularly in the later year. It is sometimes claimed that in the rural sector of developing countries the distribution of income is relatively equal since the average incomes are so close to the starvation limit. Such an argument-often attributed to Simon Kuznets but found in earlier literature as well-does not take into account either the fact that there are a number of relatively wealthy peasants, so that the distribution has a long tail, or that these data are based on household income and would be more equal if income per person were the basis of the calculation.
In addition, because of the manner in which the Madagascar data are estimated, the overall inequality coefficients for the two countries cannot be directly compared without further adjustments.4 When such adjustments are made (a weighted average of estimates A and B), it appears that income inequalities in the rural sector of Madagascar were greater, especially in the earlier year. This occurred because land was less equally distributed among smallholders in Madagascar than in Mala i, a feature arising from differences in the land tenure arrangements: in Mala i tenancy was very infrequent and a family could hold only as much land as it farmed; in Madagascar, the land was more privatized.5
Finally, Madagascar had a greater overall equality of income, due primarily to its narrower urban-rural income differentials. As noted, some incomparabilities exist between the data of the two countries, but the differences in average incomes in the urban and rural sectors were too great to be explained by differences in statistical definitions in the two nations.
Changes over Time
Aside from the increasing inequality of overall income, some other important temporal changes should be noted. The changes in income distribution, for instance, were particularly important in the rural sector, which also had the lowest average income; in the urban sector, income differentials seemed to remain roughly constant. In Madagascar, however, the estimation procedure may have understated any adverse changes in the urban sector; and, moreover, in the mid-1980s the income inequalities in the cities undoubtedly increased as unemployment rose and the rice subsidy was removed. Also, the influences of migration from the low income rural sector to the higher income urban sector were not important in either country. More specifically, simulations of the impact of population shift using the data in table 2 made little difference in the calculated inequality coefficients.6 Intrasectoral Income Differences Urban Sector In the urban sector I found little evidence that the Mala i government intervened in a conscious manner to change the distribution of wage income. The government's basic needs strategy focused more on the raising of income levels than on distributional issues per se. The wage control policies focused primary attention on the average wages in particular sectors, rather than on the structure of wages per se.
In Madagascar the situation was quite different and the most important measures deserve a brief review. In the period from 1977 to 1979 the government took three steps to influence the urban income distribution: first, it raised the minimum wages in the lowest wage 28 Economic Development and Cultural Change categories at a faster rate than the minimum wage in higher categories; second, it revised the civil service pay scale to favor the lowest paid workers (and to freeze the pay of the higher civil servants); and third, it also began to subsidize sales to the urban sector of such basic products as rice, the main staple and the largest single purchase in the budgets of the poor. This acted in a progressive manner on the urban income distribution but had a regressive effect for the income distribution of the nation as a whole since such subsidies were essentially financed by the rural sector which received a price lower than a free market price for its crops (especially those farmers who produced crops for exports). The subsidy on food consumption of the urban population was eliminated in the mid-1980s as part of the liberalization program, a policy step particularly painful to the government.
The Malagasy government also implemented a number of other policies to narrow the income distribution in urban areas, but these often achieved results opposite to what was intended. For instance, in the 1980s the government set low prices for edible oils and condensed milk (two important commodities in the household budgets of the poor), but this led to a decline of domestic production and their availability to the poor.
Rural Sector
Increases in income inequality within the rural sector-particularly among smallholders-were the critical factor underlying the overall increase in income inequality in both nations. Before turning to the impact of various governmental policies, it is useful to consider for a moment the impact of diminishing returns to labor on the land, a factor also leading to greater rural income inequalities. Although both countries experienced a land shortage, they responded in different manners.
In Mala i the average size of a smallholder farm declined markedly from the 1960s through the mid-1980s; there was very little unused arable land to be found, especially in the most populous southern region, so the rural economy was operating on the intensive margin. Since techniques of land intensification were not yet introduced on a large scale, it seems likely that the same percentage population increase in the three regions (north, central, and south) would drive average agricultural incomes further down in the southern region where diminishing returns were more severe than in the other regions; and, indeed, this appears to have happened.' In Madagascar the average smallholder's farm increased in size, but both land and labor productivity were falling, that is, the rural economy was operating on the extensive margin and was bringing into production land of increasingly bad quality. This mechanism slowed to some degree the widening of regional income inequalities in the rural sector.
Government policies played, I believe, a more important role than diminishing returns in influencing the distribution of rural income, and these measures need careful consideration for each country. The argument can only be made in a qualitative fashion since the available data do not permit an exact determination of the impact of the various policies.
Malavii.
Hastings Kamuzu Banda led his country to independence in 1964 and has remained in power ever since. His government followed an agricultural policy toward the smallholders that might be labeled (after a similarly oriented policy of the last Russian tsar) a "wager on the strong," focusing most of the public resources placed in agriculture on the richest farmers.
Before outlining the way in which such a strategy was implemented, I must emphasize that a wager on the strong is a defensible development strategy if three conditions are met: if resources channeled to the strong are more productive than if expended on the rest of the agricultural sector; if there is some trickle-down of the benefits from the wealthier part of the agricultural sector to the poorer; and if the poorer part of the agricultural sector is not disadvantaged by other government policies, by natural conditions, or by its interaction with the wealthier part of the agricultural sector. Although it lies beyond the scope of this article to argue these matters in detail, none of the three conditions were met in Mala i.8 The particular agricultural policies of the Mala i government have given rise to considerable criticism.
The Mala i government carried out its wager on the strong in a variety of ways, of which the most important were: a) In its development budget (roughly, the capital budget), the government invested from one-half to two-thirds of all resources in four large-scale integrated development projects. Before the projects started, three of the four development areas had average net farm incomes roughly twice as high as the national average; the fourth had average farm incomes slightly below the national average. Furthermore, within each of the four development areas, the number of families actually adopting the "technology and credit" package was less than one-third of the total number of families, so that the governmental funds focused on a relatively small percentage of the total population.
b) The technology and credit package, which the government offered smallholders, required them to use certain agricultural techniques in return for credit to purchase fertilizers, seeds, and other inputs. Such a package, however, involved the purchasing of large quantities of fertilizer, and such input amounts were suitable only for relatively large farms. The seeds were also for a hybrid maize for export, which was planted only by the richest smallholders. This is because such hybrid maize did not store well and also did not correspond to local tastes. The poorer smallholders followed a "safety first" strategy by first planting enough of the local maize to feed their families; only those with considerable extra land would plant the hybrid maize to the extent that they were able to take advantage of the technology and credit package. It should not be surprising, therefore, that most credit went to the wealthier smallholders. In the most recent long-term plan, this situation was noted and policies were planned for the late 1980s which would lead to a much wider distribution of credit and a change in the package so as to be more suitable for the smallholders with relatively small farm areas.9
c) The poorer farmers were forced to sell all of their export crops as well as most of their domestic crops destined for the urban areas to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), a monopsonistic purchasing parastatal. Over the decade of the 1970s ADMARC paid an increasingly lower percentage of the world market price. A particular set of richer farmers-designated "master farmers"-were permitted to sell their export crops at world market prices and receive considerably higher prices. They also received a priority in the supply of farm inputs, whenever these were scarce because of foreign exchange shortages, and special credits. d) Although Mala i had a relatively impressive network of extension workers, this service did not reach certain subsectors of the smallholding sector, for example, female-headed households, which made up about one-third of all rural households in the most populous region and which were often the poorest households. Agricultural research was also not oriented toward the problems faced by the poorest smallholders. e) In its educational policies, the Mala i government placed little emphasis on increasing the primary school enrollment. This disadvantaged the poor families in the rural sector and contributed to income inequality.
Mala i was one of the few African countries to pursue in a conscious fashion a development strategy favoring the agricultural sector. The government, however, provided the greatest help to two subsectors: the richest smallholders and the public and private estates. The estates were aided by generous credit from state banks, a method used by the government to circumvent the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Agriculture. The gamble on estate production paid off since such production was the leading sector underlying Mala i's economic growth during the 1970s. Although many have criticized Mala i's emphasis on estates, such policies did not have a direct effect on the distribution of income within the smallholder sector; the indirect effects were minor.10 It was the wager on the strong that led to a widening of rural income differentials. Mala i thus serves as an important counterexample to the oft-made but careless generalization that a development strategy based on agriculture per se leads to a more equal distribution of income.
Madagascar. In Madagascar the situation was rather different. After independence in 1960 the government of Philibert Tsiranana placed a considerable share of its development budget in the rural sector. It followed, however, a wager on the strong strategy, with emphasis on certain integrated development projects and with government aid and credit directed primarily at the richest smallholders and the estates.
The government of Gabriel Ramanantsoa (1972-75) attempted both to increase the share of government investment in the rural areas and to reverse the emphasis on aiding the richest farmers. Some observers have argued that during this period there was a considerable change in the village leadership and the distribution of such governmental aid, with more aid going to farms of smaller size; these matters, however, cannot be easily confirmed.
The socialist government of Didier Ratsiraka (1975 to the present) followed a much different development strategy, decreasing investment in the rural areas and increasing investment in industry. In 1978-79 it inaugurated a program of "invest to the hilt" (a Malagasy version of the Chinese Great Leap Forward), which had catastrophic results: a quintupling of the foreign debt, a dramatic decline in per capita GDP, and a chronic balance-of-payments crisis lasting for a decade. During the Ratsiraka period up to the mid-1980s, the following policies influenced the distribution of income in the smallholder sector. a) After 1975 agricultural credit was channeled primarily to the richer smallholders and estates, especially since several programs offering credit to smaller farms were cut back or dropped. b) During its first decade the Ratsiraka government diverted funds for maintenance of the roads to other purposes. Given the minor importance of railroads and other means of transportation of crops, this meant that the major impact of the breakdown of transportation fell on areas far removed from the cities; and those areas also had the lowest per capita incomes.
c) The Ratsiraka government turned the internal terms of trade against the rural sector so that real agricultural prices were lower than before." This meant that those farmers who relied primarily on their sales to official governmental purchasing agencies received less for their products; they were, in large part, smallholders with relatively little to sell, that is, the lower income smallholders.
d) The Ramanantsoa government began nationalizing the crop purchasing companies, and the process was completed by the Ratsiraka government. As an inadvertent result, there was a breakdown of markets. This can be seen by examining the coefficient of variation of market prices for various agricultural products in the 17 subprefectures: the statistic shows a tripling of the weighted coefficient of variations between the early and the mid-1970s. Important parallel markets for foodstuffs developed in the cities, and those most able to take advantage of the high prices (often more than double the official prices) were usually the richest farmers, who had the resources to bribe or purchase trucking services.
e) The foreign exchange scarcity induced by the overvalued exchange rate made it difficult for many to obtain the necessary agricultural inputs such as insecticides and fertilizers, not to mention consumer goods. This development also benefited the richest farmers since they had the working capital for payments to obtain the scarce inputs or to pay parallel market prices for consumer goods. f) Although the various Malagasy governments made valient efforts to achieve 100% enrollment rates in the primary schools, illiteracy did not fall the fastest in the poorest provinces. Further, during the decade after the 1970s, graduates of various schools had considerable difficulties in finding jobs commensurate with their education. Thus, education did not appear to narrow income differences, at least during the period under investigation.
Changes in the Ratio of Urban and Rural Incomes
A very important feature of the income structure in both countries was the very great difference between average incomes in the urban and rural sectors, and the narrowing of such differentials over time. This has acted to lower overall income inequalities, that is, to counteract the impact of the widening income differentials in the rural areas.
Although the differences beween the two countries appear considerable, they are due in part to the nature of the data. If we adjust the Malagasy income data to make them more consistent with production data (i.e., estimate B), the urban-rural differences become twice as great (as estimate A). Furthermore, the Mala i data include expatriates in the urban sector; the Madagascar data exclude them. If the data were made comparable in this manner, the Madagascar ratio of average urban to rural incomes would undoubtedly be still higher.
The differences between urban and rural incomes between the two countries are not just statistical artifacts but also reflect some real contrasts. During colonial times the French farmers in Madagascar were much more widespread through the countryside than the English were in the Nyasaland colony. In order to aid these colonists, the French also invested considerably in rural infrastructure, which, to a certain extent, aided the Malagasy smallholders as well. In Mala i, governmental investment in the rural sector was relatively small until after the Second World War.
From the data presented in table 2 this urban/rural income differ-ence can be studied from various aspects. Of greatest importance is that both countries reveal a narrowing of the urban/rural income gap because real urban incomes fell between the 1960s and the 1980s.
MalaVi
In Mala i between 1968/69 and 1984/85, average smallholder family income increased roughly 6%, while such income in the major towns declined about 25%. Among smallholders it is noteworthy that real family income from wages and salaries (representing off-farm employment) declined about 42%, largely because the part-time jobs in the urban areas previously held by smallholders were now being taken by rural dwellers moving permanently to the informal sector in the towns. Underlying this fall in urban income was a decrease in the real wage. From 1968 through 1985 average real wages in the modern sector fell at an average annual rate of about 3.8% a year. Several mechanisms appear to account for this dramatic decline.
Rise ofprofits at the expense ofwages.
Over the period 1968-85, the share of profits in the national income increased considerably, while the share of wages fell. In the decade before independence, the share of property income from the modern sector in the total national income fluctuated between 5% and 10%; after independence it rose to a high of 23% in 1977, before falling to 15% in 1979, the last year for which such data are available. A Stolper-Samuelson-Rybczynski mechanism appears to have been in operation, that is, capital-(and land-) intensive production increased at a faster rate than more laborintensive production, which raised the relative share of property income in the total national income. More specifically, agricultural exports rose faster than the GDP; the Central Bank maintained the exchange rate at roughly the equilibrium level; the relative prices of traded goods (crops) rose in comparison to nontraded goods and services; incomes in the sectors selling these export goods increased; and real wages in the sector producing nontraded goods (which includes many urban workers) fell.12 The fall in the wage share led to a fall in urban incomes since the increase in total income in the economy was not sufficiently great to offset such changes.
Composition of the urban labor force. Part of the fall in real
wages for the economy as a whole can also be attributed to a shift in the composition of the labor force so that the lower paid agricultural workers (estate workers) constituted a larger share of employment in the modern sector. In the urban sector alone, however, real wages have experienced an average annual fall of 3.2%; moreover, there was a shift toward jobs paying lower than average wages." 3 For instance, between 1969 and 1976, three-quarters of the newly created private-sector jobs were for unskilled jobs at wage levels below the average wage; such a composition effect lowers average wages over time, even if real wages for every specific job remained the same. Scattered evidence also suggests that as Mala ians began to fill high income jobs previously held by European expatriates, the salaries of these jobs were also reduced.
Although adequate wage data to analyze the question in detail are not available, I suspect that real wages for most specific jobs probably declined over the period, although at a relatively slow rate. Other factors. Unemployment per se was not responsible for any fall in average real wages, since the rate of joblessness appears low.14 Mala i had a considerable shortage of skilled workers, and, indeed, there was a relative rise of wages and salaries of those with more education in the years 1966-77. The joblessness that occurred was primarily among the unskilled, and this undoubtedly acted to pull down real wages at the low end of the wage scale. Aggressive actions by the labor unions to prevent this fall in real wages was also discouraged by the government. Rise of profits at the expense of wages. Although profit data are not available, it does not appear that this factor was very important. After 1975 considerable nationalization took place and the parastatal sector was subsidized, rather than serving as a source of profits. Furthermore, the Stolper-Samuelson-Rybczynski mechanism was not operative because foreign trade increased more slowly than the GDP and the relative prices of tradables did not greatly change in comparison to nontradables.
Madagascar
Composition of the urban labor force. Employment in the modern sector increased during the period from 1960 through 1984 at roughly 2.3% per year, which was considerably lower than the 6.1% annual rise in population in the urban areas. Since the modern sector in the countryside was not an important source of employment growth, the urban informal sector absorbed the new labor. Although the income of those in the informal sector is not included as wages, it had a depressing impact on the lowest urban wages. Within the formal urban sector, the fastest growing segment was the government sector, and in recent years the government raised wages at a much lower rate than inflation in order to reduce the government deficit.
Other This rather startling conclusion does not, however, correspond with more casual evidence of the very poorest from both countries. For instance, there is less visual evidence of human misery in Mala i than in Madagascar. 18 Also, unless the particular statistic used to calculate the overall inequality of income places particularly heavy weight on the lowest income levels, it is by no means certain that comparisons of the entire income distributions of the two countries would yield the same results as comparisons of the truly destitute.
Given the uncertain nature of income data at lower levels in any country, comparisons of poverty can be carried out best by examining a series of physical indicators of well-being that are particularly sensitive to real incomes of the poorest segment of the population. Such data suggest that the extent of poverty does not appear very different in the two countries; in other words, the inequality statistics presented in the discussion above do not capture an important aspect of the income distribution. The physical data also reveal different trends over time. For Madagascar information about infant mortality rates is much more uncertain.20 For 1975, estimates range from 68 per thousand (the official census datum) to 160 per thousand (a rather uncertain calculation based on use of fertility rates and age distribution data). In later years similar data uncertainties occur and, for 1985, my own estimate is that infant mortality was roughly 150 per thousand, although this may be on the high side. There is considerable evidence that infant mortality rates increased from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, only part of which can be attributed to improvements in the system of collecting mortality information.
Birth Weight
Aggregative information on the birth weight of infants is often used as a measure of the nutritional status of the women bearing the children.21 In Madagascar, a nationwide sample survey in 1984 revealed that 14.4% of the infants had a birth weight of less than 2,500 grams; smaller scale studies record considerably higher percentages. In Mala i only partial studies are available; one survey of all babies born in Malavi hospitals and health centers in July 1964 (admittedly only a fraction of total newborn babies) showed that 16.5% had birth weights lower than 2,500 grams. The difference in these percentages between the two countries appears significant; however, the quality of the data are poor, and not too much emphasis should be placed on such results.
Measurements of Weight and Height of Children
Anthropometric data of children revealing undernourishment are increasingly used as measurements of absolute poverty.22 The undernutrition data suggest few important differences in the two countries.
For Mala vi data are available from an impressive national survey of children of smallholders, which was carried out in conjunction with the 1980/81 National Sample Survey of Agriculture. For Madagascar a considerable number of smaller scale studies have been carried out on the topic, and for table 3 I have used data from three recent studies, which, unfortunately, covered relatively prosperous areas. It is likely, therefore, that a nationwide study would show greater undernutrition. Also included in table 3 is similar information for other countries so that an international perspective can be gained.
A weight/height ratio smaller than 90% (or roughly 2 standard deviations) of the international norm reflects acute undernutrition. Using this criterion, Mala i and Madagascar probably had roughly the same degree of acute undernutrition and, moreover, a higher degree than most other African nations. For Mala i, some expected differ- By this measure both Mala 'i and Madagascar had a high degree of chronic undernutrition, about 50%-60% of their children. This appears much higher than in other African nations and, given the relatively low acute undernutrition, such results seem rather peculiar. To interpret these data, two conjectures can be offered: either the children in the two countries suffered from repeated spells of illness, which meant that they might not have been acutely undernourished at any single time but that the long run impact of such sickness led to a cumulative stunting, or the ages of the Mala ian and Malagasy children were considerably overestimated. Lacking detailed data, a definitive resolution of this interpretative problem cannot be given.
The weight/age norm is the most popular method of measuring chronic protein-calorie undernutrition. It is also, however, the most ambiguous of the three measurements for several reasons. It is quite sensitive to estimates of age; and among a population with considerable illiteracy, age estimates in months are often rather uncertain. Furthermore, different investigators define undernutrition at different levels-from 75% to 90% of the World Health Organization (WHO) norms. Moreover, the presence of edema may make weight misleadingly high. Finally, children with low weight for age do not necessarily have marasmus but may be short for their age so that their low weight is appropriate for their low height, a situation that seemed to be the case in Mala i.23
These weight/age data suggest that about one-third of the children in Mala i and Madagascar were undernourished. These figures are somewhat higher than for the other African countries, but much lower than for some developing countries elsewhere. Weight/age data for other areas from other, less complete, studies (which are not shown in the table) suggest that undernutrition is somewhat greater in Madagascar than in Mala i.24
In sum, the anthropometric data suggest that the critical problem in both Mala i and Madagascar was chronic rather than acute undernutrition. Further, there appeared few important differences between the two countries: data for Antsirabe (a wealthy area) suggest lower undernutrition than in Mala i, while the data from Toamasina (a poorer area) suggest the reverse.
Poverty Trends
Times series for an assessment of trends are considerably more problematic, and only the infant mortality data permit comparisons between the two countries.25
The decrease in infant mortality in Malax i, as noted above, does not provide unambiguous evidence about a decline in poverty. The increase in infant mortality in Madagascar strongly suggests an increase in absolute poverty, since the infant mortality rate is highly sensitive to changes in income of the very poorest. This conclusion is supported by scattered data showing that in the 1980s an increasingly higher percentage of children admitted to certain hospitals showed signs of undernutrition.26 Starvation also appears to have increased in recent years although little reliable information on the subject is available. For instance, the opposition leader, Monja Jaona, noted in a speech in October 1986 that about 47,000 people had recently died from hunger in three areas in the southern part of the island. The government officially denied the number but did accept the fact that some such deaths had occurred.
The increase of poverty in Madagascar was due in greatest measure to those governmental economic policies that led to a reduction in average income following the fall of the Tsiranana government. In particular, the shift in relative prices against the agricultural sector discouraged agricultural production for the market. The "invest to the hilt" program, the overvalued exchange rate, other foreign trade policies, and governmental expenditures directed toward the maintenance of large armed forces rather than for other purposes led to a general shortage of inputs.
Growth and Income Distribution: Some Conclusions It was certainly not inevitable that economic growth be accompanied by widening income differentials in Malax i. The last decade of the colonial years in that country provided some evidence that, given the right set of incentives, production and incomes in the smallholder sector could grow rapidly. It was also not inevitable that Madagascar experience both an economic decline and an increase in income differentials. In both countries the major cause of overall increases in income inequality can be traced to a widening of income differentials among smallholders caused by a variety of policy failures, almost all of which were correctable. Some general conclusions that have relevance for other nations can be drawn from these comparisons of Mala i and Madagascar.
1. In discussions about the relationship of economic growth and income distribution in developing countries, too much attention has focused on the urban sector. In poor agricultural countries such as Mala i and Madagascar, income changes within the rural sector or in Madagascar; as measured by infant mortality rates, however, poverty appeared to increase more in Madagascar.
6. Many direct measures to redistribute income are unlikely to achieve their desired ends. Given the fiscal constraints facing both governments, the extent to which redistribution of income can be carried out through the expenditure side of the government budget is highly limited.
The detailed study of income distribution trends in the poorest nations of the world is important in order to design policies, especially concerning agriculture, that can bring about both growth and equity. A beginning has been made by others,28 and in this study I have tried to investigate other aspects of the problem, especially with regard to policies that have hitherto received relatively little attention. Such a task, of course, is difficult, for it involves both piecing together relatively poor quality data and linking trends in income distribution with particular policies. Such linkages can only be determined by microstudies of the ways in which such policies have worked out in particular countries; and the major analytic problem is to separate the impact of different economic policies.
In addition, this type of case study evidence would probably not be of sufficient quality and quantity to carry out a sophisticated crosscountry or intracountry statistical analysis or to sort out unambiguously the major causal factors involved. Nevertheless, a sufficient amount of systematic case study materials linking policies and income distribution trends can be gathered to generate presumptive cases for or against certain types of governmental measures in particular situations, especially if such evidence buttresses existing theoretical evidence. Theoretical evidence alone is often disregarded by policymakers because it is difficult for them to gain a clear understanding of abstract relationships.
In sum, the lists of factors that influence income distribution presented in this and other studies provide the bones for a useful analytic skeleton. For such work to have an impact on policy, we need to investigate more closely a greater variety of these bones and, moreover, to provide them with more flesh. 
